We present an extension of Logic Programming (under stable models semantics) that, not only allows concluding whether a true atom is a cause of another atom, but also deriving new conclusions from these causal-effect relations. This is expressive enough to capture informal rules like "if some agent's actions A have been necessary to cause an event E then conclude atom caused(A, E)," something that, to the best of our knowledge, had not been formalised in the literature. To this aim, we start from a first attempt that proposed extending the syntax of logic programs with so-called causal literals. These causal literals are expressions that can be used in rule bodies and allow inspecting the derivation of some atom A in the program with respect to some query function ψ. Depending on how these query functions are defined, we can model different types of causal relations such as sufficient, necessary or contributory causes, for instance. The initial approach was specifically focused on monotonic query functions. This was enough to cover sufficient cause-effect relations but, unfortunately, necessary and contributory are essentially non-monotonic. In this work, we define a semantics for non-monotonic causal literals showing that, not only extends the stable model semantics for normal logic programs, but also preserves many of its usual desirable properties for the extended syntax. Using this new semantics, we provide precise definitions of necessary and contributory causal relations and briefly explain their behaviour on a pair of typical examples from the Knowledge Representation literature. (Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming)
Introduction
An important difference between classical models and most Logic Programming (LP) semantics is that, in the latter, true atoms must be founded or justified by a given derivation. Consequently, falsity is understood as absence of proof: for instance, a common informal way of reading for default literal not A is "there is no way to derive A." Although this idea seems quite intuitive and, in fact, several approaches have studied how to syntactically build these derivations or justifications (Specht 1993; Pemmasani et al. 2004; Pontelli et al. 2009; Denecker et al. 2015; Schulz and Toni 2016) , it actually resorts to a concept, the ways to derive A, outside the scope of the standard LP semantics.
Such information on justifications for atoms can be of great interest for Knowledge Representation (KR), and especially, for dealing with problems related to causality. For instance, in the area of legal reasoning where determining a legal responsibility usually involves finding out which agent or agents have eventually caused a given result, regardless the chain of effects involved in the process. In this sense, an important challenge in causal reasoning is the capability of not only deriving facts of the form "A has caused B," but also being able to represent and reason about them. As an example, take the assertion:
"If somebody causes an accident, (s)he would receive a fine"
This law does not specify the possible ways in which a person may cause an accident. Depending on a representation of the domain, the chain of events from the agent's action(s) to the final effect may be simple (a direct effect) or involve a complex set of indirect effects and defaults like inertia. Focussing on representing (1) in an elaboration tolerant manner (McCarthy 1998), we should be able to write a single rule whose body only refers to the agent involved and the accident. For instance, consider the following program
representing that accident is an indirect effect of Suzy's actions. We may then represent (1) by the following rule f ine(suzy) ← suzy necessary for accident
that states that Suzy would receive a f ine whenever the fact suzy was necessary to cause the atom accident.
With this long term goal in mind, (Cabalar et al. 2014a ) proposed a multi-valued semantics for LP that extends the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and where justifications are treated as algebraic constructions. In this semantics, causal stable models assign, to each atom, one of these algebraic expressions that captures the set of all non-redundant logical proofs for that atom. Recently, this semantics was used in (Fandinno 2015b) to extend the syntax of logic programs with a new kind of literal, called causal literal, that allow representing rules like f ine(suzy) ← suzy sufficient for accident (6) and derive, from a program P 1 containing rules (2) (3) (4) 6) , that f ine(suzy) holds. However, the major limitation of this semantics is that causal literals must be monotonic and, therefore, rule (5) cannot be represented. It is easy to see that rule (5) is non-monotonic: in a program P 2 containing rules (2-5), the fact suzy is necessary for accident is satisfied and, thus, f ine(suzy) must hold, but in a program P 3 obtained by adding a fact oil to this last program, suzy is not longer necessary and, thus, f ine(suzy) should not be a conclusion.
In this paper, we present a semantics for logic programs with causal literals defined in terms of non-monotonic query functions. More specifically, we summarise our contributions as follows. In Section 2, we define the syntax of causal literals and a multi-valued semantics for logic programs whose causal values rely on a completely distributive lattice based on causal graphs. Section 3 shows that positive monotonic program has a least model that can be computed by an extension of the direct consequences operator (van Emden and Kowalski 1976) . In Section 4, we define semantics for programs with negation and non-monotonic causal literals and show that it is a conservative extension of the standard stable model semantics. Besides, with a running example, we show how causal literals can be used to derive new conclusion from necessary causal relations and, in Section 5, briefly relate this notion with the actual cause literature. In this section, we also formalise the weaker notion of contributory cause, also related to the actual cause literature, and show how causal literals may be used to derive new conclusion from them. In Section 6, we show that our semantics satisfy the usual properties of the stable modles semantics for the new syntax. Finally, Section 7 concluded the paper. The online appendices include the definition of our semantics with nested expression in the body, the formal relation with (Fandinno 2015b) , the proof of formal results from the paper and the formalisation of a Splitting Theorem for causal programs analgous to (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) .
Causal Programs
We start by reviewing some definitions from (Cabalar et al. 2014a ).
Definition 1 (Term). Given a set of labels Lb, a term t is recursively defined as one of the following expressions
t ::= l S S t 1 · t 2 where l ∈ Lb is a label, t 1 , t 2 are in their turn terms and S is a (possibly empty and possible infinite) set of terms.
When S = {t 1 , . . . , t n } is a finite set, we will write t 1 * . . . * t n and t 1 + . . . + t n instead of S and S, respectively. When S = ∅, we denote S and S by 1 and 0, respectively. We assume that application '·' has higher priority than product ' * ' and, in its turn, product ' * ' has higher priority than addition '+'. Application '·' represents application of a rule label to a previous justifications. For instance, the justification in program P 1 for atom suzy is the fact suzy itself. If rules (2-3) in program P 1 are labelled in the following way
r 2 : oil ← suzy
we may represent the justification of oil as suzy·r 2 , in other words, oil is true because of the the application of rule r 2 to the fact suzy. Similarly, we may represent the justification of accident as suzy·r 2 ·r 1 . Addition '+' is used to capture alternative independent causes: each addend is one of those independent causes. For instance, the justification of oil, in program P 3 , may be represented as suzy·r 2 + oil and the justification of accident as (suzy·r 2 + oil) · r 1 . As we will see below application distributes over addition, so that, the justification of accident can also be written as suzy·r 2 ·r 1 + oil·r 1 , which better illustrates the existence of two alternatives. Product ' * ' represents conjunction or joint causation. For instance, in a program P 4 obtained by adding the fact billy to P 3 and replacing rule (8) by r 2 : oil ← suzy, billy
the justifications of oil will be (suzy * billy)·r 2 + oil. Similarly, the justification of accident will be (suzy * billy)·r 2 ·r 1 + oil·r 1 . Intuitively, terms without addition '+' represent individual causes while terms with addition '+' represent sets of causes. It is worth to mention that these algebraic expressions are in a one-to-one correspondence with non-redundant proofs of an atom (Cabalar et al. 2014a ) and that they may also be understood as a formalisation of Lewis' concept of causal chain (Lewis 1973 ) (see Fandinno 2015b) . Figure 1 . Fig. 1 . Properties of the '·'operators: t, u, w are terms, l is a label and c, d, e are terms without '+'. Addition and product distributivity are also satisfied over infinite sums and products.
Definition 2 (Value). (Causal) values are the equivalence classes of terms under axioms for a completely distributive (complete) lattice with meet ' * ' and join '+' plus the axioms of
All three operations, ' * ', '+' and '·' are associative. Product ' * ' and addition '+' are also commutative, and they satisfy the usual absorption and distributive laws with respect to infinite sums and products of a completely distributive lattice. The lattice order relation is defined as:
Definition 5 (Causal program). A (causal) program P is a set of rules of the form:
where 0 ≤ m is a non-negative integer, r i ∈ Lb is a label or r i = 1, A (the head of the rule) is an atom and each B i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m (the body of the rule) is a literal or a term.
A rule r is said to be positive iff all literals in its body are positive and it is said to be regular if all causal literals in its body are regular. When m = 0, we say that the rule is a fact and omit the body and sometimes the symbol '←.' Furthermore, for clarity sake, we also assume that, for every atom A ∈ At, there is an homonymous label A ∈ Lb and that the label of an unlabelled rule is assumed to be its head. In this sense, a fact A in a program actually stands for the labelled rule (A : A ←). A program P is positive or regular when all its rules are positive (i.e. it contains no default negation) or regular, respectively. A standard program is a regular program in which the label of every rule is '1 :'.
Semantics. A (causal) interpretation is a mapping I :
At −→ V Lb assigning a value to each atom. For interpretations I and J, we write I ≤ J when I(A) ≤ J(A) for every atom A ∈ At. Hence, there is a ≤-bottom interpretation 0 (resp. a ≤-top interpretation 1) that stands for the interpretation mapping every atom A to 0 (resp. 1). For an interpretation I and atom A ∈ At, by max I(A) we denote the set
containing the maximal terms without addition (or individual causes) of A w.r.t. I.
Definition 6 (Causal literal valuation).
The valuation of a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A) with respect to an interpretation I, in symbols I(ψ :: A), is given by
We say that I satisfies a causal literal (ψ :: A), in symbols I |= (ψ :: A), iff I(ψ :: A) = 0.
Notice now that I(ψ 1 :: A) = I(A) for any atom A and, thus, writing a standard atom A as a shorthand for causal literal (ψ 1 :: A) does not modify its intended meaning. Causal literals can be used to represent the body of rule (5). For instance, given a set of labels A ⊆ Lb representing the actions of some agent A, we may define the query function
and represent the body of rule (5) by a causal literal of the form (ψ nec Suzy :: accident) where Suzy is the set of labels {suzy}. In the sake of clarity, we usually will write (A necessary for A) in rule bodies instead (ψ nec A :: A). If we consider an interpretation I which assigns to the atom accident its justification in program P 2 , that is, I(accident) = suzy·r 2 ·r 1 , then any term without addition G ∈ C Lb , satisfies ψ nec Suzy (G, I)(accident) = 1 iff suzy·r 2 ·r 1 ≤ {suzy} iff suzy·r 2 ·r 1 ≤ suzy iff suzy·r 2 ·r 1 + suzy = suzy which holds applying application identity, associativity and absorption w.r.t. addition suzy·r 2 ·r 1 + suzy = 1 · suzy · (r 2 ·r 1 ) + suzy = suzy
Similarly, in program P 3 , ψ nec Suzy (G, I ′ (accident)) = 1 iff suzy·r 2 ·r 1 + oil ≤ suzy which does not hold. In other words, Suzy's actions has been necessary in program P 2 but not in program P 3 . The valuation of a causal term t is the class of equivalence of t. The valuation of non-positive literals is defined as follows
Definition 7 (Causal model). Given a rule r of the form (10), we say that an interpretation I satisfies r, in symbols I |= r, if and only if the following condition holds:
An interpretation I is a causal model of P , in symbols I |= P , iff I satisfies all rules in P .
Let P 5 be the program containing rules (7) and (8) plus the labelled fact (suzy : suzy ←) and P 6 be the program containing rules (7) and (9) plus the labelled facts (suzy : suzy ←) and (billy : billy ←). Then, it can be checked that these programs respectively have unique ≤-minimal models I 5 and I 6 which satisfy I 5 (accident) = suzy·r 2 ·r 1 I 6 (accident) = (suzy * billy)·r 2 ·r 1 + oil Let now P 7 and P 8 be the labelled programs respectively obtained by adding the following rule r 3 : f ine(suzy) ← suzy necessary for accident
(resulting of labelling rule (5) with r 3 ) to programs P 5 and P 6 . Then it can be checked that these programs also have unique ≤-minimal models I 7 and I 8 which respectively agree with I 5 and I 6 in all atoms but in f ine(suzy) and, as we have seen above,
Furthermore, by definition, it holds that I j (f ine(suzy)) = I j (ψ nec Suzy :: accident)·r 3 for j ∈ {7, 8} which implies that I 7 (f ine(suzy))) = suzy·r 2 ·r 3 I 8 (f ine(suzy))) = 0·r 3 = 0 That is, Suzy would receive a fine for causing the accident, I 7 |= f ine(suzy), w.r.t P 7 , but not w.r.t. program P 8 because I 8 |= f ine(suzy).
It is worth to note that positive programs may contain non-monotonic causal literals that, somehow, play the role of negation and, hence, they may have several ≤-minimal causal models. Consider, for instance, the following positive program P 9 r 1 : p r 2 : q ← A 1 necessary for p where A 1 def ={r 1 }. Program P 9 has two ≤-minimal causal models. The first one which satisfies I 9 (p) = r 1 and I 9 (q) = r 1 ·r 2 ; and a second unintended one which satisfies I ′ 9 (p) = r 1 + r 2 and I ′ 9 (q) = 0. In the following section, we introduce the notion of monotonic programs which have a least model and a well-behaved direct consequences operator (when they are positive). In Section 4, we will see that, in fact, only I 9 is a causal stable model of program P 9 .
Positive monotonic Programs
A causal query ψ is said to be monotonic iff
program P is monotonic iff P all causal literals occurring in P are monotonic. We show next that every monotonic program can be reduced to the syntax and semantics of (Fandinno 2015b) . For space reasons, we omit here the details of (Fandinno 2015b) , which can be found in Appendix C.
Definition 8. Given a query ψ (resp. m-query φ), its corresponding m-query (resp. query) is given by
Similarly, for any program P (resp. mprogram Q) its corresponding m-program Q (resp. program P ) is obtained by replacing every query ψ in P (resp. m-query φ in Q) by its corresponding m-query φ ψ (resp.query ψ φ ). An immediate consequence of Theorem 1, plus Theorem 3.8 in (Fandinno 2015b) , is that positive monotonic programs have a least model that can be computed by iteration of the following extension of the direct consequences operator of van Emden and Kowalski (1976) .
Definition 9 (Direct consequences). Given a causal program P , the operator of direct consequences is a function T P from interpretations to interpretations such that
for any interpretation I and any atom A ∈ At. The iterative procedure is defined as usual
As usual 0 and ω respectively denote the first limit ordinal and the first limit ordinal that is greater than all integers. Thus, T Corollary 1 guarantees that the least fixpoint of T P is well-behaved and corresponds to the least model of the program P . In fact, we can check now that the least model I 6 of program P 6 satisfies I 6 (accident) = (suzy * billy)·r 2 ·r 1 + oil·r 1 . First note, that program P 6 contains facts suzy, billy and oil whose label is the same as the name atom and, thus, T ↑1 P
6
(0)(A) = A for each atom A ∈ {suzy, billy, oil}. Then, since T ↑1 P 6 (0)(suzy) = suzy, T ↑1 P 6 (0)(billy) = billy and rule (8) and fact oil belong to program P 6 , it follows that T ↑2 P 6 (0)(oil) = (suzy * billy) · r 2 + oil.
Similarly, we can check that T ↑3 P 6 (0)(accident) = ( (suzy * billy) · r 2 + oil) · r 1 = (suzy * billy)·r 2 ·r 1 + oil·r 1 and, thus, I 6 = T ↑3 P 6 (0) is the least fixpoint of T P 6 . Checking that
= I 7 and that T ↑4 P 8 (0) = I 8 are the least fixpoint and the least models respectively of programs P 5 , P 7
and P 8 is analogous. It is easy to see that every true atom, according to the standard least model semantics, has a non-zero causal value associated in the causal least model of the program, that is, some associated cause. An interpretation I is two-valued when it maps each atom into the set {0, 1}. By I cl , we denote the two-valued (or "classic") interpretation corresponding to some interpretation I s.t.
Corollary 2. Let P be a regular, positive monotonic program and Q its standard unlabelled version obtained by removing all labels from the rules in P . Let I and J be the least models of P and Q, respectively. Then, I cl = J.
Non-monotonic causal queries and negation
We introduce now the semantics for programs with non-monotonic causal queries and negation by extending the concept of reduct (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) to causal queries.
Definition 10 (Reduct). For any term t, by ψ t we denote a query such that It is easy to see that the reduct P I of any program P is a positive monotonic program and, therefore, it has a least causal model. Definition 11 (Causal stable model). We say that an interpretation I is a causal stable model of a program P iff I is the least model of the positive program P I .
We can check now that interpretation I 9 is, in fact, the unique causal stable model of program P 9 . Let Q = P I 9 9 be the reduct of program P 9 w.r.t. I 9 consisting in the following rules
where ψ(G, t) = 1 iff there exists some
iff r 1 ≤ G and r 1 ≤ A 1 = r 1 iff r 1 ≤ G. First note that T ↑α Q (0)(p) = r 1 = I 9 (p) for any ordinal α ≥ 1 because r 1 is the only rule with the atom p in the head. Then, note that
0)(p) = r 1 (there is only one such G = r 1 ) and, thus,
for any ordinal β ≥ 2. Hence, I 9 is a causal stable model of P 9 . On the other hand, we can check that I ′ 9 is not a causal stable model of P 9 . Let Q ′ = P I ′ 9 9 be the reduct of program P 9 w.r.t. I ′ 9 consisting in the same rules than program Q, but replacing ψ by ψ ′ where
(p) = r 1 + r 2 for any ordinal α ≥ 1 and, therefore, I 9 is not a causal stable model of program P 9 .
It is worth to mention that, as happened with positive programs, we can stablish a correspondence between the causal stable models of regular programs and the standard stable models of their standard version. Theorem 2 asserts that, labelling a standard program does not change which atoms are true or false in its stable models, in other words, the causal stable semantics presented here is a conservative extension of the standard stable model semantic.
Contributory cause and its relation with actual causation
Until now we have considered that an agent is a cause of an event when its actions have been necessary to cause that event. This understanding is similar to the definition of the modified HalpernPearl definition of causality given by Halpern (2015) . However, in some scenarios it makes sense to consider a weaker definition in which those agents whose actions have contributed to that event are also considered causes, even if their actions have not been necessary (Pearl 2000) . Consider, for instance, the following example from (Hopkins and Pearl 2003 for A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}, it can be shown that its unique causal stable model I 10 satisfies I 10 (dead) = load(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 + shoot(billy)·r 2
Recall that, we assume that every fact has a label with the same name. According to I 10 , the actions of the three agents appear in the causes of the atom dead, but there is no agent whose actions occur in all causes. Then, the causal literal (A necessary for dead) is not satisfied for any agent A and, therefore, it holds that I 10 (long prison(A)) = 0 for every agent A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}. That is, no agent is punished with imprisonment for the prisoner's death. On the other hand, if P 11 is a program obtained by replacing rules r A by rules
in program P 10 , we may expect that short prison(A) holds, in its unique causal stable model I 11 , for any A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}. We formalise this by defining the following query
In the sake of clarity, we will write (A contributed to dead) instead of (ψ cont A :: dead). It can be checked that load(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 ≤ load(john) and, therefore,
Consequently, I 11 (short prison(john)) = load(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 · c john . Similarly, it can be shown that I 11 (short prison(suzy)) = load(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 ·c suzy I 11 (short prison(billy)) = shoot(billy)·r 2 · c billy It is worth to note that contributory causes are non-monotonic when defaults are taken into account. Consider now the following variation of Example 1.
Example 2. Now Suzy also loads her gun as Billy does. However, Suzy's gun was broken and John repaired it.
As in Example 1, John's repairing action is necessary in order for Suzy to be able to fire her gun. However, in this case, it seems too severe to consider that John has contributed to the prisoner's death. This consideration has been widely attributed to the fact that we consider that, by default, things are not broken and that causes must be events that deviate from the norm (Maudlin 2004; Hall 2007; Halpern 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009 ). If we represent this variation by a program P 12 containing the following rules
shoot (billy) repair (john) for A ∈ {suzy, billy, john}, then it is easy to see that I 12 (dead) = repair(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 + shoot(billy)·r 2 where I 12 is the least model of program P 12 and, thus, responsible(john, dead) will be a conclusion of it. Just note that program P 12 is the result of replacing atoms loaded and load(john) in program P 11 by un broken and repair(john), respectively. Note also that nothing in program P 12 reflects the fact that by default guns are un broken. We state that guns are un broken by default adding the following rule
If P 13 is the result of adding rule (15) to program P 12 and I 13 is the least model of P 13 , then
and, consequently,
which shows that John is not considered to have contributed to the prisoner's death. Hence, short prison(john) is not a conclusion of program P 13 . It is worth to mention that besides the two syntactic differences between causal queries and m-queries already mentioned, there is a, perhaps, less noticeable difference in the evaluation of causal literals. Note that, repair(john)·r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1 ≤ r 3 * shoot(suzy) · r 1
and, thus, if we replaced G ∈ max I(A) by G ≤ I(A) in Definition 6 (as done in Fandinno 2015b), it would follows that atom short prison(john) would be an unintended conclusion of program P 13 . It is also worth to mention that, besides (Pearl 2000) approach, the notion of contributory cause is also behind the definitions of actual cause given in (Halpern and Pearl 2005; Hall 2007 ).
Properties of causal logic programs
Theorem 2 established a correspondence for regular programs, but they say nothing about programs with causal queries. For instance, positive program with non-monotonic causal literals may have more than one causal stable model. Consider the following positive program P 14 r 1 : p r 3 : q r 2 : q ← A 1 necessary for p r 4 : p ← A 2 necessary for q obtained by adding rules r 3 and r 4 to program P 9 and where A 2 def ={r 3 }. Program P 14 has two causal stable causal models. The first that satisfies I 14 (p) = r 1 + r 3 ·r 4 and I 14 (q) = r 3 . The second I ′ 14 (p) = r 1 and I ′ 14 (q) = r 3 + r 1 ·r 2 . Let now Q = P I 14 14 be the reduct of program P 14 w.r.t. I 14 , which consists in the following rules
where ψ 1 (G, t) = 1 iff there exists some
14 (p)) iff I 14 (p) = r 1 + r 3 ·r 4 ≤ A 1 = r 1 which does not hold. Thus, ψ 1 (G, t) = 0 for every G ∈ C Lb and t ∈ V Lb . Then, it is clear that the body of rule r 2 is never satisfied and, therefore, T ↑α Q (0)(q) = r 3 for any ordinal α ≥ 1. It can also be checked that ψ 2 (r 3 , T ↑α Q (0)(q)) = 1 because there exists G ′ = r 3 such that
14 is the least model of P I 14 14 and a causal stable model of program P 14 . Showing that I ′ 14 is also a causal stable model of P 14 is symmetric.
In the following we revise some desired general properties for a LP semantics. First, causal stable models should also be supported models. Note that the concept of supported model bellow is analogous to the usual concept used in standard LP, but it is stronger in the sense that, not only requires that true atoms are supported, but also all their causes must be supported by a rule and a cause of its body.
Definition 13. A interpretation I is a (causally) supported model of a program P iff I is a model of P and for every true atom A and cause
G ∈ C Lb such that G ≤ I(A) there is a rule r in P of the form of (10) such that G ≤ ( I(B 1 ) * . . . * I(B m )) · r i .
Proposition 1. Any causal stable model I of a program P is a also supported model of P .
Furthermore, as happen with programs with nested negation under the standard stable models semantics (where stable models may not be minimal models of the program), causal stable models may not be minimal models either. In fact, this may happen even when the nested negation is replaced by a non-monotonic causal literal. Consider, for instance, the following program P 15
where A 1 def ={r 1 }. Program P 15 has two causal models. One which satisfies I 15 (p) = r 1 . The other which satisfies I ′ 15 (p) = r 1 + r 2 . We define now the notion of normal program whose causal stable models are also ≤-minimal models. A program P is normal iff no body rule in P contains a consistent literal (double negated literal) nor a negated non-monotonic causal literal. In other words, a program is normal iff it does not contains nested negation nor non-monotonic causal literals in the scope of negation.
Proposition 2. Any causal stable model I of normal program P is also a ≤-minimal model.
Splitting programs. The intuitive meaning of the causal rule (13) in programs P 7 and P 8 is to cause the atom f ine(suzy) whenever the causal query expressed by its body is true with respect to a programs P 5 and P 6 , respectively. This intuitive understanding can be formalised as a splitting theorem in (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) .
Theorem 3 (Splitting). Let P b , P t a partition of a program P such that no atom occurring in the head of a rule in P t occurs in P b . An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some causal stable model J of P b such that I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ P t ).
In our running example, the bottom part are P 7,b = P 5 and P 8,b = P 6 while their top part P 7,t = P 8,t is the program containing the rule (13). This result can be generalised to infinite splitting sequences as follows.
Definition 14.
A splitting sequence of a program P is a family (P α ) α<µ of pairwise disjoint sets such that P = α<µ P α and no atom occurring in the head of a rule in some P α occurs in the body of a rule in β<α P β . A solution of a splitting (P α ) α<µ is a family (I α ) α<µ such that align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I 0 is a stable model of P 0 , 2. I α is a stable model of (J α ∪ P α ) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where J α = β<α I β . A splitting sequence is said to be strict in α if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a rule in P α occurs (in the head of a rule) in β<α P β and it is said to be strict if it is strict in α for every α < µ.
Theorem 4 (Splitting sequences). Let (P α ) α<µ a splitting sequence of some program P . An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some solution (I α ) α<µ of (P α ) α<µ such that I = α<µ I α . Furthermore, if such solution is strict in α, then I α = I |Sα where S α is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in α<β<µ P β and I |Sα denotes the restriction if I to S α .
A program P is said to be stratified if there is a some ordinal µ and mapping λ from the set of atoms At into the set of ordinals {α < µ} such that, for every rule of the form (10) and atom B occurring in its body, it satisfies λ(A) ≥ λ(B) if B does not occur in the scope of negation nor in a non-monotonic causal literal, and λ(A) > λ(B) if B does occur under the scope of negation or in a non-monotonic causal literal.
Proposition 3. Every stratified causal program P has a unique causal stable model.
Conclusions, related work and open issues
The main contribution of this work is the introduction of a semantics for non-monotonic causal literals that allow deriving new conclusions by inspecting the causal justifications of atoms in an elaboration tolerant manner. In particular, we have used causal literals to define necessary and contributory causal relations which are intuitively related to some of the most established definitions of actual causation in the literature (Pearl 2000; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Hall 2007; Halpern 2015) . Besides, by some running examples we have shown that causal literals allow, not only to derive whether some event is the cause or not of another event, but also to derive new conclusions from this fact. From a technical point of view, we have shown that our semantics is a conservative extension of the stable model semantics and that satisfy the usual desired properties for an LP semantics (casual stable models are supported models, minimal models in case of normal programs and can be iteratively computed by split table programs). It worth to mention that, besides the syntactic approaches to justifications in LP, the more related approach to our semantics is (Damásio et al. 2013 ), for which a formal comparative can be found in (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016a) and that (Pontelli et al. 2009 ) allows a Prolog system to reason about justifications of an ASP program, but justifications cannot be inspected inside the ASP program.
Regarding complexity, it has been shown in (Cabalar et al. 2014b ) that there may be an exponential number of causes for a given atom w.r.t. each causal stable model. Despite that, the existence of stable model for programs containing only monotonic queries evaluable in polynomial time is NP-complete (Fandinno 2015b) . For programs containing only necessary causal literals we can prove NP-complete (NP-hard holds even for programs containing a single negated regular literal or positive programs containing a single constraint, see Proposition 35 in the Appendix). The complexity for programs including other non-monotonic causal literals (like contributory) is still an open question. A preliminary prototype extending the syntax of logic programs with causal literals capturing sufficient, necessary and contributory causal relation can be tested on-line at http://kr.irlab.org/cgraphs-solver/nmsolver.
In a companion paper (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016b) , the causal semantics used here has been extended to disjunctive logic programs, which will be useful for representing non-deterministic causal laws. Interesting topics include a complexity assessment or studying an extension to arbitrary theories as with Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 2006) for the non-causal case; and formalise the relation between our notions of necessary and contributory cause with the above definitions of the actual causation and, in particular, with (Vennekens 2011 ) who has studied it in the context of CP-logic. A promising approach seems to translate structural equations into logic programs in a similar way as it has been done to translate them into the causal theories (Giunchiglia et al. 2004; Bochman and Lifschitz 2015) .
Appendix A. Nested expressions in rule bodies
In this section we extend the syntax presented in Section 2 in order to allow nested expressions in rule bodies (Lifschitz et al. 1999) .
Definition 15. A formula F is recursively defined as one of the following expressions
where t is a term, C is a causal literal (Definition 4) and both, E and H are formulas in their turn.
A formula F is said to be elementary iff it is a term t or a causal literal C. It is said to be regular iff every causal literal occurring in it is regular and is said to be positive iff the operator not does not occur in it. F is said to monotonic iff every causal literal occurring in F is monotonic. In formulas, we will write ⊤ and ⊥ instead of 1 and 0, respectively.
Definition 16 (Causal logic program).
Given a signature At, Lb, Ψ , a (causal logic) program P is a set of rules of the form:
where r i ∈ Lb is a label or r i = 1, A ∈ At (the head of the rule) is an atom or A = ⊥ and F (the body of the rule) is a formula.
A rule r is said to be regular iff its body is regular and its said to be positive iff its body is positive and A = ⊥. It is said to be monotonic iff F is monotonic. If F = ⊤, we say the rule is a fact and omit the body and sometimes the symbol '←.' A program P is regular, positive or monotonic when all its rules are regular, positive or monotonic, respectively. A standard program is a regular in which the label of every rule is '1 :'. Definition 16 extends Definition 5 by allowing nested expressions in the rule bodies. A causal program in the sense of Definition 5 is a program in which the body F of all rules are conjunctions of regular causal literals or their negation. Note that every rule of the form of (10) with m = 0 corresponds to a rule of the form of (r i : A ← ⊤).
Semantics. The semantics of causal logic programs with nested expressions is given as follows.
Definition 17 (Valuation). The valuation of causal literals and causal terms is as given by Definition 6. Otherwise, the valuation of a formula F is recursively defined as follows
We say that I satisfies a formula F , in symbols I |= F , iff I(F ) = 0.
Definition 18 (Causal model). Given a rule r of the form (A1), we say that an interpretation I satisfies r, in symbols I |= r, if and only if the following condition holds:
An interpretation I is a causal model of P , in symbols I |= P iff I satisfies all rules in P .
The following result shows that Definition 18 agrees with Definition 7 for programs within the syntax of Definition 5 and, thus, the former is a conservative extension of the last to programs with nested expressions in the body. We also can extend the definition of the direct consequences operator to programs with nested expressions as follows.
Definition 19 (Direct consequences). Given a causal program with nested expressions P , the operator of direct consequences is a function T P from interpretations to interpretations such that
As usual 0 and ω respectively denote the first limit ordinal and the first limit ordinal that is greater than all integers. Thus,
We will show in the Appendix C that, if P is monotonic and positive, then the T P operator has a least fixpoint that can be computed by iteration from the bottom interpretation 0.
Causal stable models of programs with nested expressions.

Definition 20 (Reduct). The reduct of a causal literal and terms is as in Definition 10. The reduct of formulas is inductively defined as follows
The reduct of program P is the program
where the reduct r I of a rule r like (10) is given by (r i : H ← F I ).
Definition 21 (Formula equivalence)
. A formula F is said to be equivalent to a formula E, in symbols F ⇔ E, iff any pair of causal interpretations I and J satisfy that I(F J ) = I(E J ).
Proposition 5. For any formula F , the following simplifications are valid align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt Note that Propositions 1 and 2 in the main part of the paper, are direct consequences of Proposition 6 together with Propositions 8 and 9, respectively. Splitting programs. The intuitive meaning of the causal rule (13) in programs P 7 and P 8 is to cause the atom responsible(suzy, accident) whenever the causal query expressed by its body is true with respect to a programs P 5 and P 6 , respectively. This intuitive understanding can be formalised as a splitting theorem in (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) .
Theorem 5 (Splitting). Let P b , P t a splitting of some program with nested expressions P . An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some causal stable model J of P b such that I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ P t ). Furthermore, if P b , P t is a strict splitting, then J = I |S where S is the set of atoms of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in P t .
In our running example, the bottom part are P 7,b = P 5 and P 8,b = P 6 while their top part P 7,t = P 8,t is the program containing the rule (13). We also can generalise this to infinite splitting sequences.
Definition 23.
1. I 0 is a stable model of P 0 , 2. I α is a stable model of (J α ∪ P α ) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where J α = β<α I β . A splitting sequence is said to be strict in α if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a rule in P α occurs (the head of a rule) in β<α P β and it is said to be strict if it is strict in α for every α < µ.
Theorem 6 (Splitting sequences). Let (P α ) α<µ a splitting sequence of some program with nested expressions P . An interpretation I is a causal stable model of P iff there is some solution (I α ) α<µ of (P α ) α<µ such that I = α<µ I α . Furthermore, if such solution is strict in α, then I α = I |Sα where S α is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in α<β<µ P β .
A program P is said to be stratified iff there is a some ordinal µ and mapping mapping λ from the set of atoms At into the set of ordinals {α < µ} such that, for every rule of the form (A1) and atom B occurring in the body F , it satisfies λ(A) ≥ λ(B) if B does not occur in the scope of negation or a non-monotonic causal literal, and λ(A) > λ(B) if B does occur under the scope of negation or a non-monotonic causal literal.
Proposition 10. Every stratified causal program with nested expressions P has a unique causal stable model if it does not contain any rule whose head is ⊥.
Propositions 3, in the main part of the paper, is a direct consequence of Propositions 6 and 10.
Normal form. Proposition 6 show that Definition 22 is a conservative extension of Definitions 11. In the following we show that, in fact, the syntax of Definition 5 is a normal form, that is, for every program P in the syntax of Definition 16, there is some program Q with the syntax of Definition 5 which has exactly the same causal stable models than P .
Definition 24. For program P and Q we write P ⇔ Q when I satisfies all rules in P J iff I satisfies all rules in Q J for any pair of causal interpretations I and J.
Definition 25 (Strong equivalence). Two programs P and Q are said to be strongly equivalent iff for every program P ′ , (P ∪ P ′ ) and (Q ∪ P ′ ) have the same causal stable models.
Proposition 11. Any two causal programs P and Q s.t. P ⇔ Q are strongly equivalent.
Proposition 12. Let P be a causal program, and let F and E be a pair of equivalent formulas, that is F ⇔ E. Any program obtained from P by replacing some occurrences of F by E is strongly equivalent to P .
The following result collects some of equivalence among formulas that correspond to those in (Lifschitz et al. 1999 ).
Proposition 13. For any formulas F , E and H, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. F, E ⇔ E, F and F ; G ⇔ G; F .
F, (E, H) ⇔ (F, E), H and F ; (E; H) ⇔ (F ; E); H.
F, (E; H) ⇔ (F, E); (F, H) and F ; (E, H) ⇔ (F ; E), (F ; H).
not(F, E) ⇔ I(not F
; not E) and not(F ; E)) ⇔ not F, not E.
not not not F ⇔ not F .
6. F, ⊤ ⇔ F and F ; ⊤ ⇔ ⊤.
7. F, ⊥ ⇔ ⊥ and F ; ⊥ ⇔ F .
not ⊤ ⇔ ⊥ and not ⊥ ⇔ ⊤.
A formula F is said to be a simple conjunction (resp. simple disjunction) iff is a conjunction (resp. disjunction) of elementary formulas. 
Proposition 14. Any formula F is equivalent to a formula of the form align=Center
Appendix B. Uniform reduct for monotonic and non-monotonic queries
An issue with Definitions 10 and 20 is that it is necessary to know whether a causal query is monotonic or not to apply the reduct. This can be provided by the user, but otherwise automatically checked whether a causal query is monotonic or not can be computationally costly. In the following, we show that, in fact, this distinction is not necessary and that the reduct can be applied uniformly to monotonic and non-monotonic causal literals.
Definition 26 (Reduct). The reduct of causal queries is defined as in Definition 10. The reduct of a causal literal is given by (ψ I(A) :: A) for any causal literal of the form of (ψ :: A). The reduct of formulas, rules and programs is then defined as in Definition 20.
Definition 26 applies the reduct uniformly to monotonic and non-monotonic causal literals. A consequence of this fact is that the reduct of monotonic programs is not itself and, in fact, the least model of the reduct of a monotonic program P I w.r.t. an interpretation I can be different according to Definitions 20 and 26. Despite that, the following result shows that the causal stable models of a program P are the same in spite of whether Definition 20 or Definition 26 is used.
Proposition 18. Let P be a causal program with nested expressions. An interpretation I is the least model of P I (according to Definition 20) iff I is the least model of P I (according to Definition 26).
Appendix C. Comparative with (Fandinno 2015b)
In this section we revise the syntax and semantics of causal programs given in (Fandinno 2015b) and show how programs in this framework can be translated in ours.
Syntax.
A m-query is a monotonic function φ : G Lb −→ {0, 1} assigning true or false to every causal graphs G ∈ C Lb . A signature is a triple At, Lb, Φ where At, Lb and Φ respectively represent sets of atoms (or propositions), labels and query functions.
Definition 27 (m-literal). A m-literal is an expression (φ :: A) where A ∈ At is an atom and φ ∈ Φ is a m-query.
Formulas, rules and programs are defined as in our framework (Section A), but replacing causal literals (Definition 4) by m-literals (Definition 27).
Semantics. The semantics of m-programs is as follows.
Definition 28 (Valuation). The valuation of a causal literal of the form (φ :: A) with respect to an interpretation I is given by
I(φ :: A) def = G ∈ G Lb G ≤ I(A) and φ(G) = 1
The valuation of causal terms and formulas is inductively defined as in Definition 17.
The definition of causal models and the T P operator is as in Definitions 18 and 19, respectively, but evaluating formulas according to Definition 28 instead of Definition 17.
Theorem 7 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a (possibly infinite) positive logic program (with nested expressions). Then, (i) lfp(T P ) is the least model of P and (ii) lfp(T
P ) = T ↑ω P (0).
Theorem 8 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a regular positive program (with nested expressions) and Q its standard unlabelled version. Then, the least model J = I
cl of Q is the twovalued interpretation corresponding to the least model I of P .
The definition of reduct and causal stable models is as Definitions 20 and Definition 22.
Theorem 9 (From Fandinno 2015b). Let P be a regular program (with nested expressions) and Q be its corresponding standard program obtained by removing all labels in P . Then, P and Q are two-valued equivalent.
Encoding (Fandinno 2015b) m-programs in our framework. In the following we show that every program according to (Fandinno 2015b) can be fitted in our framework.
Definition 29. Given a m-program Q, its corresponding program P consists of rule of the form
′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ given by ψ(G, t) = φ(G).
Proposition 19. If P is the corresponding program of some positive m-program (with nested expressions) Q, then an interpretation I is a model of P iff I is a model of Q.
Encoding of monotonic programs into (Fandinno 2015b).
It is clear that not every program in our framework can be fitted into a m-program because the last only allows monotonic queries. However, if all causal queries in a program are monotonic, then there is an equivalent m-program given as follows.
Definition 30. Given a program with nested expressions P in which all causal queries are monotonic, its corresponding m-program Q consists of rule of the form
′ is the result of replacing every query ψ by its corresponding query φ given by φ(G) = ψ(G, 1).
Proposition 20. If Q is the corresponding m-program of some positive monotonic program with nested expressions P , then an interpretation I is a model of P iff I is a model of Q.
Note that Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 4 together with the result of Propositions 19 and 20. Furthermore, the following Corollaries 3, 4 and 5 are direct consequences of Proposition 20 together with the results of Theorems 7, 8 and 9, respectively. Corollary 6 is a direct consequence of Corollary 5.
Corollary 3. Any (possibly infinite) positive monotonic causal program with nested expressions P has a least causal model I which (i) coincides with the least fixpoint lfp(T P ) of the direct consequences operator T P and (ii) can be iteratively computed from the bottom interpretation
Corollary 4. Let P be a regular positive monotonic program with nested expressions and Q its standard unlabelled version obtained by removing all labels from the rules in P . Let I and J be the least models of P and Q, respectively. Then, I cl = J.
Corollary 5. Let P be a regular program with nested expressions and Q be its corresponding standard program obtained by removing all labels in P . Then P and Q are two-valued equivalent.
Corollary 6. Any two regular programs with nested expressions that only differ in their labels are two-valued equivalent.
Corollaries 1 and 2 and Theorem 2 in the main part of the paper are direct consequences of Proposition 4 plus Corollaries 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
Appendix D. Proof of Results
Preliminary facts
Proposition 21 (From Cabalar et al. 2014a). Addition, product and application are monotonic operations, that is, t + u
Proposition 22 (From Cabalar et al. 2014a) . Every causal value G ∈ C Lb without addition is completely addition-prime, that is, G ≤ t∈T t implies that G ≤ t for some t ∈ T where T ⊆ V Lb is a set of causal values. 
Properties of the causal queries and causal literals
Proof. By definition, it follows that
with X ∈ {I, J}. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that J(ψ :: A) ≤ I(ψ :: A). Then, there is G ∈ max J(ψ :: A) such that G ≤ I(ψ :: A). Note that G ∈ max J(ψ :: A) implies G ∈ max J(A) and, since J ≤ I, this implies that there exists
Hence, since J ≤ I and ψ is monotonic, ψ(G, J(A) ) = 1 implies ψ(G ′ , I(A) ) = 1 and, therefore, G ≤ G ′ ≤ I(ψ :: A) which contradicts the assumption.
Proposition 24. The reduct of a causal query ψ w.r.t. term t, in symbols ψ t is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose that ψ t is not monotonic. Then there are G, G ′′ ∈ C Lb and u, w ∈ V Lb such that G ≤ G ′′ and ψ t (G, u) = 1, but ψ t (G ′′ , w) = 0. By definition,
Similar for G ′′ and w. Pick some G satisfying (D1). Since G ′ ≤ G and G ≤ G ′′ , it follows that G ′ ≤ G ′′ and, since G ′ ≤ G ′′ and G ′ ∈ max t and ψ(G ′ , t) = 1, it also follows that ψ t (G ′′ , w) = ψ t (G ′′ , u) = 1 which is a contradiction with the assumption. Hence, ψ t is monotonic.
Proposition 25. Any monotonic causal query ψ satisfies that
and, thus, there exists some G ′ ≤ G such that G ′ ∈ max t and that ψ(G ′ , t) = 1. Since ψ is monotonic, G ′ ≤ G and ψ(G ′ , t) = 1 implies that ψ(G, u) = 1 for any u ∈ V Lb which is a contradiction with the fact that ψ(G, u) = 0. 
Properties of formulas
Proposition 27. Any monotonic formula F is ≤-monotonic, that is, J(F ) ≤ I(F ) for any causal interpretations I and J such that J ≤ I.
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), from Proposition 23, it follows that J(ψ :: A) ≤ I(ψ :: A). Otherwise, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma holds for every subformula of F . In case that F = (E, A), by induction hypothesis E and A are ≤-monotonic and, thus, since product is also monotonic, it follows that F is ≤-monotonic. The case F = (E; A) is analogous. Finally, for the case F = not E, just note that F is not positive and, thus, F is not monotonic by definition.
Proposition 28. Any causal interpretation I and formula F satisfy I(F I ) = I(F ).
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), its reduct (ψ :: A) I is (ψ I(A) :: A). Furthermore, by definition,
Then, G ∈ max I(ψ I(A) :: A) implies that G ∈ max I(A) and there exists some
and, consequently, G ≤ I(ψ :: A). That is, I(F I ) ≤ I(F ). The other way around. G ∈ max I(ψ :: A) implies that G ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1 which in turn imply that ψ I(A) (G, I(A)) = 1 and G ∈ max I(ψ I(A) :: A). Consequently, I(ψ I(A) :: A) = I(ψ :: A).
In any other case, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma holds for every subformula of F . In case that F = (E, H), by definition,
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis I(E I ) = I(E) and I(H I ) = I(H) and, thus,
The case F = (E; H) is analogous. Finally, for the case H = not E, just note that I(not E) I = I(⊥) = 0 iff I |= E I iff I |= E iff I(not E) = 0. Otherwise I(not E) I = I(⊤) = 1 and I(not E) = 1. Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ ′ :: A), from Proposition 26, it follows that
that F ′ = F and the lemma statement follow from the above inequality. Otherwise F ′ = F I and the result follow in a similar way.
We proceed by structural induction assuming the statement holds for every subformula of F . In case that F = (E, H), by definition,
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis,
and, since product * is monotonic, it follows that,
The case F = (E; H) is analogous. Finally, note that F = not E is not a positive formula and, by definition, it is not a monotonic formula either.
Proposition 29. Let F be a monotonic formula and I be an interpretation. Then, J(F
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma D.1.
Proposition 30. Let F be a normal formula and I be an interpretation. Then, J(F
Proof. In case that F is a causal literal of the form (ψ :: A), its reduct (ψ ::
Since G ′ ≤ G ≤ J(A) ≤ I(A) and G ∈ max I(A), it follows that G = G ′ . Then, since J ≤ I, queries are anti-monotonic in the second argument and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1, it follows that ψ(G, J(A)) = 1 and, since G ∈ max J(A), it also follows that G ≤ J(ψ :: A). That is,
Otherwise, we proceed by structural induction assuming the lemma holds for every subformula of F . In case that F = (E, A), by definition,
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, J(E I ) ≤ J(E) and J(H I ) ≤ J(H) and, since product * is monotonic, it follows that,
The case F = (E; H) is analogous. Finally, in case F = not E, since F is a normal formula, E is positive and every query ψ occurring in E is monotonic. Hence, from the fact J ≤ I and the fact that monotonic formulas are also ≤-monotonic, it follows J(E) ≤ I(E) (Proposition 27). Furthermore,
That is, J( (not E) I ) = 1 implies that J(not E) = 1. Otherwise, J(not E) I = 0 and the term 0 is smaller than any causal value and, thus, J( (not E) I ) ≤ J(not E) holds and, consequently, it follows that J(F I ) ≤ J(F ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that I is a model of P w.r.t. Definition 7 and suppose that I is not a model of P w.r.t. Definition 18. Then, there is a rule r of the form of (r 1 where B j is a positive literal with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and B j is either a negative or a consistent literal with m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n. According to Definition 20, if I |= B j with m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then the reduct of rule r is a rule r I of the form
where C j is the reduct of causal literal B j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. After applying the simplifications in Proposition 5, it follows that r I becomes
which agrees with Definition 10. On the other hand, if I |= B j for some m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, it follows that B I J = ⊥ and, therefore,
Hence, r I is of the from
and r I does not belong to P I after removing all rules whose body is ⊥. Therefore, the reduct according to Definition 20 is the same as the Definition 10 for programs with the syntax of Definition 5 and the causal stable models w.r.t. Definitions 11 and 22 are the same, too.
Proof of Proposition 19
Lemma D.2. Let F be some m-formula and F ′ be is corresponding formula obtained by replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ given by ψ(G, t) = φ(G). Then, it holds that I(F ) = I(F ′ ) for every interpretation I.
Proof. In case that F = (φ :: A) is a m-literal, by definition
Furthermore, since φ is monotonic, for every G ≤ I(A) such that φ(G) = 1, there is some G ′ such that G ≤ G ′ ∈ max I(A) and φ(G) = 1 and, thus,
Then, since ψ(G, t) = φ(G) for any t ∈ V Lb , it is clear that
In case that F is not a m-literal, the proof follows by structural induction assuming as induction hypothesis that I(E) = I(E ′ ) for every subformula E of F .
Proof of Proposition 19.
Assume that I is a model and Q and suppose that I is not a model of P . Then, there is some rule r of the form (r i :
However, since r is in P there is a rule r ′ of the form (r i : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.2, it follows that I(F ′ ) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ′ ) · r 1 ≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption that I is a model of Q.
The other way around is symmetrical. Assume that I is a model and P and suppose that I is not a model of Q. Then, there is some rule r ′ of the form (r i :
However, since r ′ is in Q there is a rule r of the form (r i : A ← F ) in P where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.2, it follows that I(F ′ ) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ) · r 1 ≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption that I is a model of P .
Proof of Proposition 20
Lemma D.3. Let F be some formula and F ′ be is corresponding m-formula obtained by replacing every query ψ by its corresponding m-query φ given by φ(G) = ψ(G, 1). Then, it holds that
Proof. In case that F = (ψ :: A) is a causal literal, by definition
Furthermore, since ψ is monotonic, ψ(G, I(A)) = ψ(G, 1)) and, thus
Then, since φ(G) = ψ(G, 1), it is clear that
Proof of Proposition 20.
However, since r is in P there is a rule r ′ of the form (r i : A ← F ) in Q where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.3, it follows that I(F ′ ) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ′ ) · r 1 ≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption that I is a model of Q.
However, since r ′ is in Q there is a rule r of the form (r i : A ← F ) in P where F ′ is the result of replacing every m-query φ by its corresponding query ψ. Then, from Lemma D.3, it follows that I(F ′ ) = I(F ) and, thus, I(F ) · r 1 ≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the assumption that I is a model of P . Proof. It is clear that T ↑α P,I (0) ≤ T ↑α P (0) for every ordinal α. Furthermore, from Theorem 1, it follows that I = T ↑ω P (0) and, thus, T ↑ω P,I (0) ≤ I. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this inequality is strict, that is, T ↑ω P,I (0) < I holds. Then, there is some atom A and causal value G ∈ max I(A) such that G ≤ T ↑α P,I (0) for every α < ω. Since I = T ↑ω P (0) and G ≤ I(A), it follows that there is some α < ω such that
Lemma D.5. Let I be the least model of some monotonic program P and α be an ordinal. Let ψ be a causal query and let Q be either P I or the result of replacing in P I the reduced causal query ψ t by its non-reduced form ψ.
for every monotonic formula F and F ′ where F ′ is either F I or the result of replacing in F I the reduced causal query ψ t by its non-reduced form ψ.
Proof. If F = (ψ ′ :: A) is a causal literal and ψ ′ = ψ, then F ′ = F and the result trivially holds.
Then, assume that
On the other hand, G ∈ max T ↑α P,I (0)(ψ :: A) imply that ψ(G, T ↑α P,I (0)(A)) = 1 which, since ψ is monotonic, implies that ψ(G, I(A)) = 1. Then, since G ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1, it follows that ψ I(A) (G, u) = 1 for every u ∈ V Lb . This plus (D2) imply
Let us define the rank of a formula such that the rank of a causal literal is 0 and the rank of any other formula is the greater than the rank of all their subformulas and assume as induction hypothesis that T ↑α
for every monotonic formula E of less rank than F .
In case that F = (E, H), it follows that G ∈ max T ↑α P,I (0)(F ) holds only if there are causal values G 1 and G 2 such that
Since E and H have less rank than F , by induction hypothesis, it follows that
and, thus,
Finally, note that the case in which F = (E; H) is analogous and that since F is monotonic the case F = not E is not valid. Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that I is not a model of program Q. Then, there is a rule r ′ = (r i :
where F ′ is the result of replacing in F some causal literal (ψ :: A) in Q by its reduced form (ψ I (A) :: A). Since, from Lemma D.1, it follows that I(F ′ ) ≤ I(F ) and '·' is monotonic, I(F ′ )·r i ≤ I(A) implies that I(F )·r i ≤ I(A) which is a contradiction with the fact that I is a model of P because there is a rule r = (r i : A ← F ) in P .
To show that I is the least model of Q assume as induction hypothesis that T In case that α is a successor ordinal, G ∈ max T ↑α P,I (0)(A) holds only if G ∈ max I(A) and there is some rule r = (r i : A ← F ) in P and causal value
Furthermore, by induction hypothesis, it follows that T ↑α−1
and, thus, Lemma D.5 implies that T ↑α−1
In case that α is a limit ordinal, G ≤ T Proof of Proposition 18. Let Q be the reduct of program P w.r.t. I and Definition 10 and Q ′ be the reduct of program P w.r.t. I and Definition 26. Then, Q is monotonic and, from Lemma D.6, it follows that I is the least model of Q iff I is the least model of Q ′ .
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that I is not a model of P . Then there is a rule r in P of the form of (10) such that I(F )·r i ≤ I(A). Since rule r is in P , rule r I of the form
is in P I . Furthermore, I(F ) = I(F I ) from Proposition 28 and, thus, I(F I )·r i ≤ I(A). That is, I is not a model of r I and, consequently, is not a model of P I which contradicts the assumption that I is a causal stable model of P .
Lemma D.7. Let P be a program, I be an interpretation and α be an ordinal. Let Q be the result of replacing in P I the reduced causal query ψ t of every monotonic query by its non-reduced 
On the other hand, G ∈ max T ↑α Q (0)(ψ :: A) imply that ψ(G, T ↑α Q (0)(A)) = 1 which, since ψ is monotonic, implies that ψ(G, I(A)) = 1. Then, since G ∈ max I(A) and ψ(G, I(A)) = 1, it follows that ψ I(A) (G, u) = 1 for every causal value u ∈ V Lb . This plus (D6) imply that
In case that F = (E, H), it follows that G ∈ max T ↑α Q (0)(F ) holds only if there are causal values
and H have less rank than F , by induction hypothesis, it follows that
The case in which F = (E; H) is analogous. In case that F = not E, by definition it follows that
Proof of Proposition 1 and 8
Lemma D.8. The reduct
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t. Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Proposition 9.
Proof of Theorem 3 and 5
Definition 31. A splitting of a program P is a pair P b , P t of pairwise disjoint sets such that P = (P b ∪ P t ) and no atom occurring in the head of a rule in P t occurs in the body of a rule in P b . A splitting is said to be strict if, in addition, no atom occurring in the head of a rule in P t occurs (the head of a rule) in P b .
Lemma D.10. Let P b and P t be two monotonic programs such that no atom occurring in a body in P b is a head atom of P t . Let I and J be the least models of (P b ∪ P t ) and P b , respectively. Then, I is also the least model of program (J ∪ P t ). Furthermore, J |S = I |S where S is the set of atoms of all atoms not in the head of any rule in P t .
Proof. Since interpretation J is the least model of the program J and J ≤ I, it follows that I satisfies all rules in program J. In addition, since I is the least model of program (P b ∪ P t ), it is clear that I also satisfies all rules in P t and, thus, I satisfies all rules in program (J ∪ P t ). Suppose that I is not the least model of (I ∪ P t ). Then, there is a model I ′ of (J ∪ P t ) such that I ′ < I. Since I is the least model of program (P b ∪ P t ) and I ′ < I, it follow that I ′ does not satisfy some rule r = (r i :
is a model of (J ∪ P t ), it is clear that J ≤ I ′ and, since in addition I ′ < I, it follows that I(F ) · r i ≤ J(A) also holds. Furthermore, I
′ satisfy all rules in P t because I ′ is a model of (J ∪ P t ) and, thus, rule r must be in P b and no atom occurring in F occurs in the head of a rule in P t . Hence, I(F ) = J(F ) and, thus, I(F ) · r i ≤ J(A) implies that J(F ) · r i ≤ J(A) which is a contradiction with the hypothesis that J is a model of P b and the fact that r in P b . Consequently, I is also the least model of program (J ∪ P t ). Furthermore, since I is the least model of program (J ∪ P t ) and no atom in S occurs in the head of any rule in P t , it follows that I |S = J |S . I and, consequently, I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ P t ) and I |S = J |S where S is the set of atoms of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in P t . In addition, since I |S = J |S and all atoms in the body of some rule in P b are in S, it follows that P and a causal stable model of P b . Furthermore, if no atom occurring in P b occurs in the head of a rule in P t , then J |S = J (note that S contains all atoms in P b since no atom occurring in P b occurs in the head of a rule in P t ) and, thus, I |S = J.
Proof of
The other way around. If I is a causal stable model of (J ∪ P t ), then I is the least model of (J ∪ P t ) I = (J ∪ P I t ). Let S be the of all atoms not occurring in the head of a rule in P t . Then, S contains all atoms occurring in the body of the rules in P b and, since I is the least model of (J ∪ P I t ), it follows that I |S = J |S and, thus, P Proof of Theorem 3. Note that, from Proposition 4, the causal stable models of programs w.r.t. Definition 7 and 18 agree and, therefore, the statement directly follows from Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 6
Lemma D.11. Let (P α ) α<µ a splitting sequence of some monotonic program P . Then, there is a unique solution (I α ) α<µ of (P α ) α<µ and it satisfies (i) I = α<µ I α and (ii) I α|S α = I |Sα where I is the least model of P and S α is the set of all atoms not occurring in the head of any rule in α<β<µ P β .
Proof. First note that, since P is a monotonic program, every P α with α < µ is also monotonic and, thus, there is a unique causal stable model I 0 of P 0 . Suppose that there is a solution (I ′ α ) α<µ of (P α ) α<µ such that I ′ α = I α for some α < µ. Let α be the first ordinal such that I ′ α = I α . Then, 0 < α < µ and there are two different causal stable models I α and I ′ α of (J α ∪ P α ) which is a contradiction with the fact that (J α ∪ P α ) is monotonic.
Let I = α<µ I α and we will show that I is the least model of P and that I α = I |Sα . Assume as induction hypothesis that the lemma statement holds for every ordinal µ ′ < µ and note that, in case that µ = 0, it follows that P = α<0 P α = ∅ and that I = α<0 I α = 0 and that 0 is the least model of the empty program.
In case that µ is a successor ordinal, let µ ′ = µ − 1 be its predecessor, let Q = α<µ ′ P α and J be the least model of Q. Then, (I α ) α<µ ′ is solution of (P α ) α<µ ′ , Q, P µ ′ is a splitting of P , and, by induction hypothesis J = α<µ ′ I α and I α|S α = J |Sα for every α < µ ′ .
Let I µ ′ be the least model of (J ∪ P µ ′ ). Since I µ ′ is the least model of (J ∪ P µ ′ ), it follows that I µ ′ ≥ J and, thus, I = α<µ I α = I µ ′ + α<µ ′ I α = I µ ′ + J = I µ ′ . That is, I = I µ ′ is the least model of (J ∪ P µ ′ ) and, since J is the least model of Q, from Lemma D.10, it follows that I is the least model of P = (Q ∪ P µ ′ ) and, that, I µ ′ |S µ ′ = I |S µ ′ . Furthermore, since no atom in S α with α < µ ′ occurs in the head of any rule in P µ ′ it follows that I |Sα = J |Sα for every α < µ ′ . Consequently I α|S α = I |Sα for every α < µ.
In case that µ is a limit ordinal, by induction hypothesis I α|S α = I |Sα for every α < µ ′ and, thus, since all atoms occurring in the body of any rule in P α belong to S α , it follows that P Iα α = P I α . Furthermore, since (I α ) α<µ is solution of (P α ) α<µ , it follows that I α is the least model of (J α ∪ P α ) and, thus, I α is a model of P Iα α = P I α . Since I = α<µ I α ≥ I α , then I is a model of P I α for every α < µ ′ and, consequently, I is a model of P I . Suppose that I is not the least model of P . Then, there is a model I ′ of P such that I ′ < I.
Since I = α<µ I α and I ′ < I, it follows that I α ≤ I ′ for some first ordinal α < µ. Since α is the first ordinal such that I α ≤ I ′ , it follows that J α = β<α I β ≤ I ′ and, thus, I ′ satisfies all rules in J α . Furthermore, since P α ⊆ P and I ′ is model of P , it follows that I ′ also satisfies all rules in P α . That is, I ′ is a model of (J α ∪ P α ) and I α ≤ I which is a contradiction with the fact that I α is the least model of (J α ∪ P α ). Consequently, I is the least model of P . Suppose now that I α|S α = I |Sα for some α < µ and let α be the first such ordinal. Then, there is some first ordinal α ′ and atom A ∈ S α such that I α (A) ≤ I α ′ (A). Note that α ′ ≤ α implies that I α ′ ≤ I α and, thus, it must be that α < α ′ . Since α ′ first ordinal that satisfies
and I α ′ is the least model of (J α ′ ∪ P α ′ ), there must be some rule r = (r i : A ← F ) ∈ P α ′ which is a contradiction with the fact that A ∈ S α and α < α ′ .
Consequently, I α|S α = I |Sα for all α < µ.
Proof of Theorem 6. For the only if direction. Assume that I is a causal stable model of P . Then, I is the least model of the monotonic program P I and, from Lemma D.11 there is a unique solution (I α ) α<µ of program P I and it satisfies (i) I = α<µ I α and (ii) I α|S α = I |Sα . Furthermore, by definition, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
1. I 0 is the least model of P I 0 , 2. I α is a stable model of (J α ∪ P I α ) for any ordinal 0 < α < µ where J α = β<α I β .
Since I α|S α = I |Sα and all atoms occurring in the body of any rule in P α belong to S α , it follows that P I α = P Iα α and, thus, align=Center, leftmargin=10pt, itemindent=0.5pt
Since program P 16 is positive it has unique causal stable model I 16 . Furthermore, it is easy to see that the interpretation of atoms p 1 and q 1 with respect to interpretation I 16 are a + b and c + d, respectively. The interpretation for p 2 corresponds to:
This addition cannot be further simplified. Analogously, I 16 (q 2 ) can also be expressed as a sum of four sufficient causes -we just replace m 2 by n 2 in I(p 2 ). But then, I 16 (p 3 ) corresponds to (I 16 (p 2 ) * I 16 (q 2 )) · m 3 and, applying distributivity, this yields a sum of 4 × 4 sufficient causes. In the general case, each atom p n or q n has 2 2 n−1 sufficient causes so that expanding the complete causal value into this additive normal form becomes intractable. Furthermore, it also has been in (Cabalar et al. 2014b ) that deciding whether a term without addition G is a brave necessary cause with respect to some regular program P is Σ P 2 -complete and, thus, deciding the existence of causal stable model is Σ P 2 -hard even for the class of programs that only contain a unique necessary causal literal.
Proposition 31 (From Cabalar et al. 2014b) . Given a causal term without addition G ∈ C Lb and an causal term t ∈ V Lb in which the right-hand operand of every application "·" is a label, deciding whether G ≤ t is feasible in polynomial time.
Proposition 32. Let {t, u} ⊆ V Lb be two causal term in which the right-hand operand of every application "·" is a label. Then deciding whether t ≤ u is in coNP.
Proof. Note hat t ≤ u iff every G ∈ C Lb such that G ≤ t also satisfy G ≤ u which are decidable in polynomial time (Proposition 31). Consequently, deciding whether t ≤ u is coNP.
Definition 32 (Causal graph). Given a set of labels Lb, a causal graph (c-graph) G ⊆ Lb × Lb is a set of edges transitively and reflexively closed. By G Lb we denote the set of all c-graphs that can be formed with labels from Lb. Proof. Suppose first that T Note now that the evaluation of conjunctions and disjunctions is ≤-monotonic and, thus, it can be probed by induction that T ↑α P I (0)(F ) ≤ T ↑α Q (0)(F ) ≤ I(F ) for every formula F . Finally, since addition and application are also ≤-monotonic, it can be shown by induction that 
